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The Nevada Supreme Court considered a Petitioner home builder’s petition for 
writ relief and appeal of a district court order granting Respondent HOA’s ex parte 
motion for a stay and enlargement of time for service pursuant to NRS 40.647(2)(b). 
Ruling on Petitioner’s two writ petitions, the Court held the district court’s grant of a stay 
was not in error and the NRCP 41(e) five-year limitation period was tolled under the 
Boren2 exception to NRCP 41(e).  Accordingly, the Court denied both writ petitions. 
Background 
 
High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association operates Arlington 
Ranch community, which consists of 342 individual units contained in 114 buildings.  
The sales documents for these units preclude express and implied warranty actions after 
two years.  On July 7, 2007, High Noon filed a complaint against homebuilder, D.R. 
Horton, alleging breach of implied and express warranties, breach of contract, and breach 
of fiduciary duties.  While High Noon did not specifically allege its claims fell within 
NRS 40’s construction defect provisions, High Noon moved for an ex parte stay and 
enlargement of time for service pending completion of construction defect pre litigation 
procedures pursuant to NRS 40.647(2)(b).  Conversely, D.R. Horton moved for dismissal 
pursuant to NRCP 41(e)’s five-year rule.  The district court denied the motion to dismiss 
and granted a stay, which commenced on April 13, 2007.  Over eight years later, NRS 




Writ relief is appropriate 
 
While writ relief is generally not available when “adequate and speedy legal 
remedies exist,”3 the Nevada Supreme Court may exercise discretion to intervene to 
clarify issues of law and promote judicial economy and administration.4  This case calls 
the Court to address two important issues in Nevada construction defect law, namely, 
whether NRS 40.647(2) allows a stay of proceedings for a party to comply with NRS 
Chapter 40 construction defect prelitigation duties, and whether the stay tolls the running 
of the five year period under NRCP 41(e).  Accordingly, as a threshold issue, writ relief 
is appropriate here.  
                                                        
1  By Brandonn Grossman 
2  Boren v. City of North Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 638 P.2d 404 (1982). 
3  Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). 
4  Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008) (quoting State v. 
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002)).  
 Granting stay pursuant to NRCP 40.647(2) 
 
  NRS 40.647(2)(b) specifically states that a plaintiff who files a constructional 
defect suit before completing pre litigation process would be prevented from filing 
another suit “because the action would be procedurally barred by the statute of limitations 
or statute of repose, the court shall stay the proceeding pending compliance with [NRS 
Chapter 40 requirements].”5    
Because NRS Chapter 40 does not prevent any defense otherwise available6 and 
D.R. Horton attempted to limit its warranties in their sales documents to a two-year 
period pursuant to NRS 116.4116(1), D.R. Horton could argue a shorter limitations 
period based on these sales contracts.  Based on contractual modification of the NRS 
Chapter 116 limitation period for warranties, the Court broadly interpreted NRS 
40.647(2)(b) to allow the district court to enter stay, analogous to its authority in a statute 
of limitations context, so High Noon could undertake NRS Chapter 40 pre litigation 
process without jeopardizing its claim.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district 
court’s grant of a stay and enlargement of time. 
The August 2007 stay tolled the five-year rule under the Boren exception 
While NRCP 41(e)’s five-year rule requires dismissal of an action where a case 
has not been brought to trial after five years,7 the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized 
exceptions to the mandatory nature of this required dismissal.  The Boren exception reads 
“any period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by 
reason of a stay order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of 
[NRCP] 41(e).”8  The Court determined the Boren rule applied here, where the matter 
was stayed until completion of NRS 40.600 litigation process and the August 2007 stay 
effectively tolls the NRCP 41(e) period while stay is in effect.   
The future of Boren  
The Court declined to interpret Boren and its progeny as requiring district courts 
to evaluate the diligence of parties in determining if a valid court-ordered stay tolls the 
NRCP 41(e) period.  A proper stay, such as the one here, tolls this prescriptive period as 
long as the stay remains in effect, notwithstanding diligence of the parties. The Court 
importantly noted such stays prevent parties from prosecuting the case.  Additionally, the 
Court refused to adopt a new exemption to the Boren rule excluding constructional defect 
stays from tolling.  The Court determined stays by way of NRS 40.647(2)(b) in the 
construction defect context are given the full period allowed by NRCP 41(e).  
Accordingly, NRS Chapter 40 litigants are included in the Boren exception. 
 
                                                        
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.647 (2)(b). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.635(3). 
7 NEV. R. CIV. P. 41(e). 




The Court denied both writs, holding the August 2007 stay is valid, which tolled the five-
year prescriptive period under NRCP 41(e), pursuant to Boren.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
